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This study attempts to reconcile conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government 
ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006-
2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these 
ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the 
governments’ role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state 
enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that 
undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign 
banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital 
ratios.  
Key words:  Banking, Capital, Adjustment Speed, Government ownership, China 
JEL: G21; G28; C32 
                                                          
1
 *Corresponding author: Philip Molyneux pmolyneux@sharjah.ac.ae.   Fax: +97165050549. 
 Email addresses: a) c.jiang@mdx.ac.uk (C.Jiang); b) hong.liu@abdn.ac.uk (H. Liu). 
Acknowledgement: We are grateful for comments from Kose John, Bill Francis, and participants at various 
seminars, the IFABS Barcelona Conference (2016), and Wolpertinger Conference Santander (2017). All errors 
and omissions are of course the responsibility of the authors. This research is financially supported by National 
Natural Science Foundation of China (No.: 71363014). 
2 
 
1. Introduction   
The role of bank capital has received extensive attention after the Great Recession. It is 
particularly important for systemically important banks (SIBs) because capital shortfalls here 
can have economy-wide consequences when the rest of the financial system is 
undercapitalized (Brownlees and Engle 2017). This also provides the economic rationale for 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to introduce new regulations under Basel III 
specifically requiring SIBs to provide greater capital surcharges. In contrast to banking 
systems in developed counties where SIBs are privately owned, in developing countries SIBs 
are more likely to be government-owned. Whether these government-owned SIBs should 
hold higher capital as required by privately-owned SIBs in developed countries depends on a 
fundamental and yet unsolved issue – the role of government ownership in banking that can 
affect capital behaviour. This paper is particularly motivated by these issues and aims to 
better understand the effect of government ownership on bank capital behaviour, especially 
given the potential implications for financial stability and the well-being of the economy as a 
whole. 
Whether government-owned banks have higher or lower target capital ratios than their private 
sector counterparts is open to debate.
 
Although government-owned banks (especially SIBs) 
with large capital shortfalls have high levels of systemic risk, they are implicitly guaranteed 
by governments as these banks are perceived as “Too-big-to-fail (TBTF)” or “Too-important-
to-fail (TITF)”. Under state safety net protection government-owned banks are more likely to 
obtain capital injections at times of crisis. Capital shortfalls in government-owned banks can 
be recovered in a short period of time by the state and this may not lead to systemic distress 
even if the rest of the banking system is undercapitalized. This would give government-
owned banks a special advantage in comparisons with their private sector counterparts. 
Government-owned banks backed by abundant state funds can make different capital 
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decisions. We propose a “government support” view and argue that government ownership 
may induce banks to hold lower capital and adjust capital levels slower towards target levels 
in comparison to private banks because of the greater likelihood of readily available 
government support when in distress.   
This argument, however, may not hold when we consider government-owned bank’s main 
functions in the economy. There are two broad views of government’s participation in banks. 
The “development” view (Gerschenkron, 1962) believes that government-owned banks act 
‘‘benevolently’’ and direct resources toward strategic and socially desirable long-term 
projects to foster growth. The "political" view (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) argues that state 
ownership does not provide  the relevant  incentives to ensure socially desirable investments 
and is more likely to encourage government-owned banks to finance inefficient but politically 
desirable projects (in exchange for votes, political contributions, and bribes). These two 
views, although different in nature, both predict that government-owned banks should hold 
more capital than private banks to finance preferred development/political projects and/or to 
strengthen state finances (through the purchase of government debt), and their desire to adjust 
capital towards target levels may be stronger than for private banks. 
In this paper we attempt to reconcile these conflicting theories in predicting whether 
government-owned banks should hold higher or lower capital than private banks thereby 
advancing our understanding of the role of government ownership in banking, particularly in 
affecting bank capital behaviour. We examine the impact of government ownership on bank 
target capital ratios and the adjustment speed towards target levels. We conduct this study on 
banks from a single country – China, which enables us to analyse the effects of government 
ownership in a uniform operating and regulatory environment. The Chinese banking system 
has experienced significant changes since market-oriented reforms commenced in the late 
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1970s. Various reforms since 2003 have resulted in a mixture of ownership types where the 
government plays a key role alongside domestic private and foreign banks. These reforms 
focus on prudential and risk management regulations following the Basel capital rules.
2
 As 
the country became increasingly influential on the world stage, the solvency of its banking 
system inevitably became more important. China is now home to the world’s largest banking 
sector (in assets size) including four of the world’s top ten largest banks by market 
capitalization.
3
  
We use granular ownership data hand-collected from the annual reports of banks operating in 
China, matched with financial data from the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database. Banks’ 
capital ratios are modelled using a partial adjustment framework that allows for bank-specific 
and time-varying target capital ratios and heterogeneous adjustment speeds in a three-step 
procedure (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; De Jonghe and Öztekin, 2015). We find that, 
compared to private banks, government-owned banks have higher capital ratios and 
adjustment speeds, suggesting that the “development/political” view outweighs the 
“government support” view.  
The existing finance literature generally treats government owners as a homogeneous group 
although the political economy literature has long recognized differences among levels of 
government with respect to responsibilities, functions, values, and resource allocation (Olson, 
1969; Sharpe, 1970). In our study, we consider three main types of government ownership: 
central government- (CGOBs), local government- (LGOBs), and state enterprise-owned 
(SEOBs) banks. We conjecture that CGOBs are more likely to obtain capital injections at 
times of crisis than other types of government-owned banks (LGOBs and SEOBs). This is 
                                                          
2
 China has committed to global regulatory reform under Basel rules. The first issuance of the Regulation 
Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks in 2004 came into effect on 1 March 2004. The recent 
adoption of the Basel III framework – the Capital Rules for Commercial Banks in 2012 came into force on 1 
January 2013 with full implementation by March 2019.  
3
 For the top bank rank, see http://www.thebanker.com/Top-1000-World-Banks. 
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because CGOBs are mainly SIBs and central government can provide CGOBs easy access to 
relatively abundant state funds. Moral hazard problems are more profound for CGOBs, which 
may dis-incentivise their desire to hold more capital and adjust capital quickly. Our empirical 
evidence supports this conjecture. Specifically, we find that LGOBs and SEOBs have higher 
target capital ratios and adjustment speeds than private banks, and CGOBs have lower capital 
ratios and adjustment speeds than both LGOBs and SEOBs. These results suggest that the 
“development/political” view and the “government support” view have an offsetting effect on 
CGOBs’ capital behaviour. 
Our evidence also shows that banks react to their capital gaps (the difference between target 
and actual capital ratios) through balance sheet channels and banks’ rebalancing strategies 
vary by ownership type. Consistent with our main findings, we find that, relative to 
overcapitalized banks
4
, undercapitalized LGOBs and SEOBs achieve their target capital 
levels by boosting equity directly, undercapitalized CGOBs do not make any significant 
changes in their balance sheets, and undercapitalized foreign banks contract various types of 
assets and liabilities without increasing equity capital.  
Our paper provides new insights into bank capital behaviour from the perspective of 
government ownership, with particular attention to different forms of state owners. Research 
on capital structure, including studies of non-financial firms, focus on ownership effects in 
terms of managerial and external block ownership (Friend and Lang, 1988), control and cash 
flow rights (Johnson et al., 2000; Lepetit, Tarazi and Zedek, 2015), and ownership 
concentration (Shehzad, De Haan, Scholtens, 2010). The influence of government ownership 
on bank capital behaviour has not previously been adequately addressed. In a study by 
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 We also test for whether overcapitalized banks’ balance sheet movements vary with ownership type and 
evidence suggests no significant differences in the changes of balance sheet items across different ownership 
types.  Hence we treat overcapitalized banks as the default group regardless of ownership types.      
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Memmel and Raupach (2010), private banks are found to adjust capital ratios more quickly 
than savings and co-operative banks in Germany.
5
 As far as we are aware, the literature is 
silent on the impact of various types of government owners even though they may differ in 
many aspects, such as the source of capital, strategic objectives, and political and economic 
influence, all of which can impact the dynamics of bank capital behaviour. Our unique 
dataset allows us to explore these issues and the findings are of use to policy makers in 
formulating reforms and maintaining stability in banking systems with prevalent levels of 
government ownership.  
This study is also related to the empirical literature on government ownership in the financial 
sector, including its impact on bank performance (Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005; Jiang, 
Yao and Feng 2013), lending behaviour (Sapienza, 2004), financial development (Barth, 
Caprio and Levine, 1999), and economic growth (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
2002). It also relates to work on the role of bank capital during and after the global financial 
crisis in 2008 which covers issues concerning: the cyclicality of capital requirements 
(Andersen, 2011; Agenor and Silva, 2012), bank behaviour in capital 
management/adjustment (Berger et al., 2008; Memmel and Raupach, 2010), the effects of 
capital on lending (Berrospide and Edge, 2010), stock returns (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2010) 
and liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). 
Our findings shed light on the debate over post-crisis regulatory reform from the perspective 
of emerging and developing countries, most of these countries have adopted new 
international capital rules – Basel III standards – that will become effective by 2019.6 The 
                                                          
5
 As pointed out by the authors, “the sample (of the study) is biased towards large banks and is therefore not 
representative of the German banking sector”. 
6
 As of end-March 2017, all 27 member jurisdictions of the Basel Committee, including 10 emerging and 
developing countries, have risk-based capital rules, liquidity coverage ratio regulations and capital conservation 
buffers in force (BCBS, 2017). The ten emerging and developing countries include Argentina, Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.  
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extant bank capital literature mainly focuses on developed countries. To this end, we analyse 
bank capital behaviour in an emerging market setting and this is linked to government 
ownership and a range of bank-level and macroeconomic characteristics. Our findings are 
likely to be of interest to policymakers and bankers in countries where government-owned 
banks have a substantial market presence (as in Argentina, Brazil, China, India and Indonesia) 
as well as in other smaller emerging economies (such as Slovenia and the United Arab 
Emirates).  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
sample and research methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
provides evidence that banks react to capital gaps and their adjustment strategies vary by 
ownership type.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Ownership and bank capital behaviour: hypotheses  
The literature on bank capital structure suggests the existence of an optimal capital ratio 
(Myers and Rajan, 1998; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011). This optimal capital ratio is 
theoretically determined by the trade-off between various costs, such as the expense of bank 
failure as a result of under-capitalization (Acharya, 1996), tax savings from deposits or debt 
financing (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Graham, 2000), and a potential fall in the stock 
price as raising equity may be interpreted as a sign of overpricing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Banks operate in a dynamic world and respond to changes in the internal and external 
operating environment. The dynamic trade-off theory predicts that capital adjustment takes 
place to remove deviations from targets – when the cost of deviation from the target exceeds 
the cost of adjustment toward the target (Fischer, Heinkel, Zechner, 1989). When transaction 
costs are significant, banks may slow down the capital adjustment process and operate at a 
sub-optimal level (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Ownership, as an important corporate 
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governance mechanism, can have a major influence on management decisions and hence on 
bank capital behaviour.  
A number of theories offer conflicting predictions that government-owned banks may set 
lower or higher target capital ratios than private banks. Our “government support” view stems 
from the budget constraint theory (Kornai 1979, 1986; Kornai et al., 2003) that government-
owned banks face soft budget constraints (they are not allowed to fail and can rely on 
government capital support when requested) and we argue that these banks  are more likely to 
hold less capital than private banks. While budget constraints may soften for private 
ownership (Kornai 1986; Kornai et al., 2003), especially for ‘too-big-to-fail’ private banks in 
the event of a crisis, government-owned banks with strong political connections are more 
likely to be bailed out than those without these connections (Faccio et al., 2006). Government 
interventions for failing large private commercial banks may be delayed (and can be 
unpredictable) even in times of crisis due to political concerns and/or mutual forbearance 
(Brown and Dinç, 2005), while state support for government-owned banks is more likely to 
prevail over time. In many emerging and developing economies, there are no (or limited) 
explicit deposit insurance schemes and government-owned banks have implicit government 
guarantees (that can be viewed as quasi deposit insurance). These banks are less likely to face 
depositor runs and if this happens the government is expected to bailout those in trouble. 
Therefore government-owned banks are likely to hold lower capital ratios because of the 
greater potential for obtaining government support. Moreover, while government and private 
banks are subject to the same supervisory rules, in practice, regulatory forbearance is more 
likely to apply to government-owned banks. This lowers the cost of non-compliance for 
government-owned banks and may also induce them to operate at lower capital ratios.   
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Different ownership features also determine banks’ incentives and ability to adjust capital 
ratios. Private banks subject to capital market discipline have stronger incentives to make 
prompt capital adjustments to keep their capital ratios within a narrow range around the target 
so as to maximise stockholder wealth (Memmel and Raupach, 2010). Government-owned 
banks in contrast have less incentive to adjust capital ratios promptly because state protection 
may shield these banks from market discipline (Iannotta et al., 2013). In short, due to more 
readily available resources/support and moral hazard problems, banks with state ownership 
lack the incentives to hold more capital and are more likely to have lower capital targets and 
slower adjustment speeds.  Hence, based on the “government support” view, we hypothesize 
that:  
Hypothesis 1a: government-owned banks have lower target capital ratios than private banks. 
Hypothesis 1b: government-owned banks adjust capital at a slower speed toward the target 
capital ratio than private banks. 
Economists hold different views about the role of government ownership in banking. The 
“development” view (Gerschenkron, 1962) argues that government-owned banks act 
‘‘benevolently’’ and direct resources toward strategic and socially desirable long-term 
projects to foster growth. The "political" view (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) argues that the 
lack of incentives to ensure socially desirable investments encourages government-owned 
banks to finance inefficient but politically desirable projects, in exchange for votes, political 
contributions, bribes, and the like. Both views highlight the importance of government-owned 
banks in the economy. Also government-owned banks can be used as a source of ready 
demand to acquire government debt, or at least the authorities will find it easier to coerce 
government-owned banks to buy government debt, compared to private banks. This seems to 
be the case in China where we find that over 2006-2015, government-owned banks on 
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average held more government-issued debt (8.04 % of their total assets) compared to private 
domestic (5.23%) and foreign banks (5.98%).
7
 When government-owned banks fulfil these 
functions their strategic focus is more likely to be directed towards political, social and other 
objectives. They may well be forced to hold more capital and react faster to capital gaps than 
their private sector counterparts. Based on the “development/political” view, the following 
contrasting hypotheses may hold:   
Hypothesis 2a: government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios than private banks. 
Hypothesis 2b: government-owned banks adjust capital at a higher speed toward the target 
capital ratio than private banks. 
State ownership can be at different levels, through central or local government holdings, or 
through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), state-owned financial institutions, and through other 
agencies (such as the Ministry of Finance). In this study we focus on the three most common 
state ownership forms, namely banks owned by the central government, local government, 
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These state owners differ significantly in incentives and 
ability to provide support for their banks. The central government normally has the strongest 
political and economic position in the country as it is responsible for maintaining financial 
stability and promoting national economic development. CGOBs are usually the mainstay of 
a country’s financial system – the SIBs. When CGOBs face financial difficulties, the central 
government has a strong incentive to provide support in order to alleviate systemic risk 
pressures. Support can be provided readily (in most cases at least) due to government’s 
access to abundant state funds.  
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 We test the statistical significance of correlations between bank ownership types and government debt 
holdings by regressing the ratio of government debt holdings to total assets against the ownership variables 
(private banks are treated as the default group). Results (available on request) confirm that government-owned 
banks provide more support to financing government than private banks and there is no difference between 
foreign and private banks (regardless of whether or not we control for size and year fixed effects).   
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Local governments have more divergent economic and social interests. Unlike their central 
counterparts, local governments cannot create money and so have limited financial capacity 
to provide support for LGOBs.  LGOBs are mainly smaller regional banks and their failure is 
unlikely to pose a systemic treat to the financial system as a whole. Also, maintaining 
financial stability is not local governments’ main concern. As a consequence, when LGOBs 
are in trouble they are less likely to obtain prompt bailout support.    
SEOBs share greater commonalities with private banks in that they focus more on value-
maximization rather than promoting national/regional economic development, social and 
financial stability. Usually SEOBs operate to facilitate the financing of the commercial 
activities of their state owners, while the failure of SEOBs are less likely to have significant 
impacts on the owners’ main businesses as these large SOEs normally have access to and 
depend more on CGOBs. SEOBs are also less likely to pose a significant threat to financial 
stability. Therefore, in the event of crisis, SEOBs may not get the same level of supports as 
CGOBs. 
All in all, implicit government guarantees of support are more certain for CGOBs than for 
LGOBs and SEOBs. As we have noted already, government support may induce moral 
hazard problems that dis-incentivise banks to hold higher capital ratios and adjust capital 
quickly. Hence, we expect CGOBs to have lower capital targets and slower adjustment 
speeds, while LGOBs and SEOBs that face less certain government support have stronger 
incentives to hold higher capital and quickly close any capital shortfall.  Based on the above 
discussions, we formulate the following hypotheses:  
Hypotheses 3a: CGOBs have lower target capital ratios than LGOBs and SEOBs  
Hypotheses 3b: CGOBs adjust capital at slower speeds than LGOBs and SEOBs. 
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3. Model, variables, and data   
3.1. The empirical model  
Following the literature on capital structure (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Öztekin and 
Flannery, 2012; De Jonghe and Öztekin, 2015), we apply a variable speed partial adjustment 
model to empirically examine how bank ownership affects target capital ratios and the 
adjustment speed to achieve the targets. The target capital ratio ( *
,tik ) is modelled as a 
function of firm characteristics as in equation (1):  
𝑘𝑖,𝑡
∗ =
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
∗
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟      (1)  
where *
,tiK  is the book value target capital; tiA ,  the book value of risk-weighted assets; β is a 
vector of coefficients, 
1, tiX  is a set of ownership variables and controls for bank-specific 
features, and Dyear is the year dummy for controlling year fixed effects.  
Banks may hold excess capital or operate below the target due to potentially high adjustment 
costs. In a partial adjustment model, a bank’s current capital ratio (
tik , ) is a weighted average 
of its target capital ratio ( *
,tik ) and the previous period’s capital ratio ( 1, tik ) and random 
shock ( ti ,
~
 ): 
𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑘𝑖,𝑡
∗ + (1 − 𝜆)𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + ti ,
~
                                                         (2) 
Substituting equation (1) for the target capital ratio into equation (2) yields the following 
specification for equation (3), which is used to test H1 and H2 under a constant adjustment 
speed. 
 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆(𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + (1 − 𝜆)𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + ti ,
~
                                                          (3) 
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Equation (4) further allows for a firm-specific adjustment speed (
1,  tiZ ), which varies 
with annual bank characteristics: 
𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 = ( 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1)(𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + ti ,
~
                      (4) 
where 
tik , is the observed bank capital ratio, λ is a scalar for adjustment speed,   is a vector 
of coefficients for the adjustment speed function,
1, tiZ is a set of bank characteristics that 
affect adjustment speed λ, 
1, tiX is a set of ownership variables and variables of bank-specific 
characteristics that affect target capital ratios, Dyear is year dummy for controlling year fixed 
effects, and ti ,
~
 is a random error. 
The model is estimated using a three-step procedure. First, we assume a constant adjustment 
speed λ for all banks and estimate a standard partial adjustment model in equation (3). As the 
lagged dependent variable is present on the right hand side of equation (3), we employ the 
System GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) using both lags in levels (2-4 lags) and 
differences as instruments with the Windmeijer correction (Windmeijer, 2005). We use the 
Hansen test to examine the validity of over-identifying restrictions in the GMM estimation 
(Hansen, 1982). We also use the AR test for the second-order autocorrelation in the residuals 
from the GMM estimation to determine the number of lags that ensure no second-order 
autocorrelation in the error term. The main purpose here is to obtain estimated sˆ that are 
used to calculate an initial set of target capital ratios 1,
*
,
ˆˆ
 titi Xk  for each bank each year. 
These estimates, however, may be biased because the adjustment speed (λ) is assumed to be 
constant. 
14 
 
In the second step, the gap ( tiG ,
ˆ ) between the estimated target capital ratio and observed 
actual capital ratio in the previous year is calculated as in equation (5), which is substituted 
into equation (3). 
1,1,,
ˆˆ
  tititi kXG                                        (5) 
tittitititi
GZkk ,,1,1,,
~ˆ)(                               (6) 
Equation (6) is a linear model that regresses changes in the capital ratio against the product of 
capital gap ( tiG ,
ˆ ) and exogenous variables affecting the adjustment speed. Equation 6 is 
essentially in first difference and we use pooled OLS to estimate ˆ  that are required to 
calculate the varying adjustment speed 
ti , for each bank in each year. The literature suggests 
that banks adjust their capital towards desired targets at different speeds (Memmel and 
Raupach, 2010). We derive bank-specific variable adjustment speeds in this step, which are 
then used in the third step. 
In the third step, target capital ratios are re-estimated by substituting the variable adjustment 
speeds 1,
ˆ
 tiZ obtained from the second step into equation (3). After rearranging the equation, 
we have the following model (7) which is estimated using a fixed effects estimator: 
titititititi XZZkk ,1,1,1,1,,
~
])ˆ[()ˆ1(          (7) 
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In this step, bank-specific adjustment speeds are used to obtain estimates of the unbiased 
target capital ratio. The estimates of β in equation (7) capture the effects on bank target 
capital ratios of ownership and other bank-specific characteristics.
8
 
3.2. Sample, capital ratio and ownership variables  
We restrict our analysis to 2006 onwards when ownership data for most banks became 
available and operational restrictions on foreign banks’ Renminbi business were removed. 
Financial data are collected from the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database. Our initial sample 
includes 112 commercial banks (621 observations) with complete data on Tier1 and Total 
capital ratios. In order to ensure all banks have time to adjust their capital positions we keep 
banks with data for at least 4 consecutive years. The final sample is an unbalanced panel of 
73 banks over the period 2006-2015 with 487 observations, accounting for 86% of total 
assets of commercial banks in the Chinese banking system at the end of 2014.  Variables are 
defined in Table 1 and summary statistics are presented in Table 2. All variables are 
winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels to mitigate the impact of outliers.
9
       
We consider two regulatory capital ratios: Tier1Cap is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk-
weighted assets; and TotalCap is the ratio of total capital (Tier1+Tier 2 capital) to total risk-
weighted assets.
10
 Table 2 shows mean Tier 1 capital ratios of 12.97 % and Total capital 
ratios of 14.78 %. On average, banks regulatory capital ratios are well above the minimum 
                                                          
8
 One concern could be the simultaneity bias between changes in ownership and capital behaviour. In this paper, 
we are interested in whether government-owned banks hold more or less capital, relative to their targets, 
compared to private banks. From this setting ownership structure is exogenous to the target capital ratio because 
ownership features are pre-determined. Moreover, in our sample, ownership characteristics are relatively stable 
– only two small city commercial banks changed ownership from private to become local-government owned 
over the period under study. As such, we do not believe that the simultaneity bias (endogeneity) is a major 
concern in our analysis. 
9
 We perform a correlation analysis for the dependent and explanatory variables and multicollinearity is not a 
major issue in our sample.  
10
 Capital definitions are from the Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks (2004) issued 
by the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Tier 1 core capital includes paid-up capital/common stock, 
reserves, capital surplus, retained earnings and minority interests, while Tier 2 supplementary capital constitutes 
revaluation reserves, general loan-loss reserves, preference shares, convertible bonds and long-term 
subordinated debt. 
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requirements of 4% for the Tier 1 capital ratio and 8% for the total capital ratio. Bank capital 
mainly constitutes Tier 1 core capital that is more than 87% of total capital.  
[Table 1 around here] 
[Table 2 around here] 
Ownership data are hand-collected from bank annual reports that disclose information on the 
ten largest stockholders who on average hold 73.4% of banks’ outstanding stock ranging 
from 27% to 100%. The ten largest stockholders fall into three categories – government, 
domestic private, and foreign. The literature suggests that a bank is considered as controlled 
if it has at least one stockholder who owns more than 5% (Azofra and Santamaria, 2011) or 
10% (Lepetit et al., 2015; Laeven and Levin, 2009) of total outstanding stock. 
As the relationship between stockholders’ stakes and their influences on bank management 
decisions is non-linear, we use dummy variables to proxy for different ownership types 
instead of their actual shares.
11
  We classify banks into three mutually exclusive types – 
government-owned, domestic privately-owned (which we call ‘private’), and foreign-owned 
banks. We further classify government-owned banks into central government- (CGOBs), 
local government- (LGOBs), and state enterprise-owned (SEOBs) institutions. A set of 
ownership dummy variables are defined as follows. Government is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for government-owned banks and 0 otherwise and a bank is classified as 
government-owned if the largest shareholder is government (central, local or SOE) that holds 
more than 5% of total outstanding stock.  Foreign is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
foreign banks and 0 otherwise where a bank is classified as foreign if the largest shareholder 
is a foreign investor holding more than 5% of total outstanding stock. Private is a dummy 
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 According to international accounting reporting standards, a change in stakes from 49% to 51% (19% to 21%) 
grants the corresponding stockholder majority control (significant influence).  
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variable that equals 1 for domestic private banks and 0 otherwise where a bank is classified as 
a domestic private bank if the bank is neither a government-owned nor a foreign bank.
12
 We 
further differentiate government-owned banks into three sub-categories and define three 
dummy variables: CGOB that equals 1 if the central government is the largest shareholder 
and 0 otherwise, LGOB that equals 1 if the local government is the largest shareholder and 0 
otherwise, and SEOB that equals 1 if a SOE is the largest shareholder and 0 otherwise. As a 
bank’s top ten owners holdings may change over time, our measures allow for changes in a 
bank’s ownership type accordingly. As shown in Table 2, on average, the largest shareholder 
holds 86% of total outstanding stock in foreign banks, 60% in CGOBs, more than a quarter in 
LGOBs and SEOBs, and 10% in private banks. For LGOBs, SEOBs and private banks, the 
(average) total shares held by the same ownership type dominates other ownership types with 
no close ultimate owners of different types. This ensures that our ownership classification 
represents the interest of the dominant type of owners.  
Our approach to defining ownership is based on the nature of the controlling owner following 
the convention in the academic literature. It is different from the majority of existing research 
on Chinese banking that defines ownership according to a historical classification, namely:  
state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, and city commercial banks. 
This classification has become inadequate since major ownership reforms commenced in 
2003 and the distinction between these types of banks has become blurred. For instance, 
some joint-stock commercial banks have more than 50% of their shares owned by the 
government, while all government-owned  and city  commercial banks have gone through 
substantial joint-stock ownership restructuring.  
                                                          
12
 When applying a threshold of 10%, changes in ownership classification is small and our main conclusions 
hold (results are available from the authors on request).  
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In addition to the above ownership variables, we also control for the effect of institutional 
investors on capital adjustment speeds (but not on the target capital ratio).
13
 Following 
ownership reforms, financial institutions (FIs) have started to take stakes in banks and 41% of 
our sample have such investors. The total institutional investors’ shareholdings average 3.8% 
and the proportion of institutional investors with more than a 5% shareholdings is small, so it 
seems that these owners may not have a significant influence on management decisions and 
hence a limited influence on target capital ratios. Moreover, the majority of institutional 
investors in fact are state-owned and are normally dominated by other types of state owners 
as part of overall state funding arrangements. These FIs are treated as SOEs when classifying 
ownership and hence we do not separately exam FIs’ impact on target capital ratios. On the 
other hand, the literature suggests that institutional investors perform active monitoring which 
can reduce information asymmetries (Chen et al. 2007) and may help lower capital costs 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008), namely, by lowering financing and/or transaction expenses 
associated with raising capital. FIs’ ownership may provide better access to markets and 
therefore can influence capital adjustment speeds. Banks with financial institutional 
ownership therefore are expected to adjust capital faster than those without such shareholders. 
We define Financial Institution as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for banks with 
financial institution investors and 0 otherwise.  
3.3. Control variables  
In order to more accurately model target capital ratios and the adjustment process, we 
introduce a set of control variables. In particular, when estimating bank target capital ratios 
we control for the effect of bank profitability, risk, size, income growth and diversification. 
                                                          
13 Literature suggests that different institutional investors vary in incentives and ability to influence management 
decisions (Chen et al., 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011) and it would 
be ideal to distinguish independent institutional investors (i.e. pension and mutual funds and investment 
companies) from dependent institutional investors (i.e., banks and insurance companies that have business 
relationship). However, given that institutional investors in Chinese banking are still at an early stage of 
development and not large, we leave this for future research. 
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We employ ROE as a measure of profitability that is closely linked to retained earnings as a 
major internal source of capital, and the literature suggests it has a positive impact on capital 
(Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2010).
14
  Both standard corporate 
finance arguments and the regulatory view indicate a prominent role of risk and suggest a 
positive impact on capital ratios. Some studies find supportive evidence for non-financial 
firms (Lemmon et al., 2008) and banks (Gropp and Heider, 2010), while others find that this 
effect is insignificant (Titman and Wessels, 1988). We control for the impact of bank credit 
risk and Risk is proxied by the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio. Large banks may have 
lower target capital ratios because of their “too-big-to-fail” status or are better known to the 
market (Gropp and Heider, 2010; Brewer, Kaufman, Wall, 2008), while they may also hold 
larger buffers due to increased complexity and heightened asymmetric information problems. 
We control for the size effect using Size – defined as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if a bank’s total assets is greater than the average total assets of all banks in the sample and 0 
otherwise. Fast-growing firms face higher agency costs of debt as shareholders have more 
flexibility to expropriate wealth from debtors (Titman and Wessels, 1988). This suggests a 
positive link between growth opportunities and capital ratios. Banks with greater growth 
potential may also hold higher capital to be financially prepared when investment 
opportunities emerge. We include Income growth and expect a positive impact on the target 
capital ratio. Deregulation and increased competition has induced banks to diversify their 
income sources by performing new activities that generate non-interest income. More 
diversified income sources (non-interest activities) are often associated with profitability 
gains but higher risk due to their unstable nature (Stiroh, 2004, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 
2006). Profitability gains provide a source of capital (through greater retained earnings) and 
                                                          
14
 As expected, there is a negative correlation between equity to total assets and ROE (-0.59) – greater leverage 
(lower equity to total assets ratio) increases ROE. Moreover, we also cross check using ROA as an alternative 
measure of profitability and our main conclusions still hold (results are available from authors on request).  
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higher risk also demands more capital. We include Diversification defined as the ratio of non-
interest income to total operating income.  
When modelling bank-specific adjustment speeds we control for the effects of the cost of 
capital, risk, size, income diversification, liquidity, GDP growth, and inflation. Adjustment 
costs are important factors affecting adjustment speeds, although it is difficult to measure 
these costs. Following Ayuso et al., (2004) and Jokippi and Milne (2008), we include ROE to 
proxy for the direct cost of raising equity capital and Risk (measured by NPL ratios) to proxy 
the cost of failure. Size is measured by the log of banks’ total assets and large banks are 
expected to adjust capital slower than small banks due to potential moral hazard problems 
linked to “too-big-to-fail”. Jokipii and Milne (2008) find that banks with well-diversified 
income sources have a lower probability of experiencing a large decline in their capital ratios. 
Such banks tend to have stable capital ratios and hence we speculate these banks adjust 
capital slowly. The literature also suggests that undercapitalized banks may lack incentives to 
quickly close the gap to target compared to banks whose capital ratios are above target (De 
Jonghe and Öztekin, 2015). To control this effect, we define a dummy variable – Below that 
takes the value of 1 if a bank’s actual capital ratio is below the target and 0 otherwise. We 
control for the effect of the macro-economic environment using GDP growth – the annual 
percentage change in gross domestic product and Inflation is the annual percentage change in 
the average consumer price index.
15
     
Panel A in Table 3 shows the mean values for key bank-specific variables across different 
ownership types. Foreign banks hold the highest capital ratios by all measures – Tier 1 capital 
of 17.98% and Total capital ratios of 18.96% that are much higher than those of domestic 
                                                          
15
 There is an extensive literature on the impact of board structure on bank capital structure (e.g., Jensen, 1993).  
However, little work (as far as we are aware) has been undertaken on how the composition of boards may 
influence bank’s decisions to adjust capital towards their target level - a potential direction for future research.  
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banks. Variations in capital ratios among banks of different ownership types may also relate 
to bank-specific features, an issue we investigate in section 4. CGOBs are the most profitable 
(ROE) and largest banks in the market, while foreign banks are the smallest in total assets 
with the least diversified income sources and lowest propensity for (credit) risk-taking (NPL 
ratio).   
 [Table 3 around here] 
As a preview from Panel B in Table 3, we observe that the use of the constant adjustment 
model tends to underestimate the target capital ratios of LGOBs and SEOBs, and 
overestimates those for CGOBs, foreign banks and private banks, compared to the results 
from the bank-specific variable adjustment speed set-up in step 3. We observe significant 
variations in estimated adjustment speeds among banks with different ownership. CGOBs 
have the lowest adjustment speed at 0.20, while SEOBs have the highest adjustment speeds at 
0.60 (see a more detailed discussion in section 4.2). The differences across ownership types 
are economically significant. For instance, private banks and LGOBs close 70% of the 
distance to the target Tier1 capital ratios in 4 years (1-(1-0.26)×4=0.70), and the figures for 
CGOBs, foreign banks, and SEOBs are 59%, 68%, and 97%, respectively.  
4. Empirical analysis 
We test the hypotheses developed in section 2 using the three-step model described in section 
3.1. Bank capital is measured using two risk-weighted regulatory capital ratios, namely, the 
Tier 1 capital ratio (Tier1Cap) and total capital ratio (TotalCap). We treat private (domestic) 
banks as the default group.  
4.1. Ownership and bank target capital ratios under a constant adjustment speed (Step 1) 
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This section investigates ownership effects on bank target capital ratios by estimating 
equation (3) using the System GMM estimator. Panel A in Table 4 reports the results where 
government-owned banks are treated as a single group in columns 1-2 and differentiated into 
three sub-groups (CGOBs, LGOBs and SEOBs) in columns 3-4. Results from the Hansen and 
AR(2) tests suggest that the instruments are valid and there is no evidence of second-order 
serial correlation in the error term. The constant adjustment speed of the Tier1 capital ratio is 
0.432 per year (=1- 0.568, where 0.568 is the coefficient of the lagged capital ratio reported 
in the first specification). Banks adjust their total capital ratio slightly quicker than the Tier1 
capital ratio.  
We find no difference between the target capital ratios of government and private banks as 
the coefficients on Government are insignificant in columns 1-2, thus rejecting both 
Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a. When we consider the three types of government-owned 
banks, the coefficient on LGOBs is negative and significant in column 4 suggesting that 
LGOBs have lower target capital ratios than private banks providing limited evidence 
supporting Hypothesis 1a. We also find no evidence supporting Hypothesis 3a: CGOBs have 
lower target capital ratios than LGOBs and SEOBs. We find foreign banks have higher target 
capital ratios compared to private banks.  Results from the control variables suggest that 
credit risk, income growth, and inflation induce banks to choose higher target capital ratios, 
while profitability, size and income diversification fail to show any significant impacts. As 
we noted earlier, the results from this step, however, need to be interpreted with caution due 
to the strong assumption of a constant adjustment speed across banks and over time.  
[Table 4 around here] 
4.2.Ownership and bank capital adjustment speeds (Step 2) 
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In this section, we obtain estimates of bank-specific adjustment speeds from equation (6) and 
examine how ownership and other bank-specific and macroeconomic factors jointly explain 
the heterogeneity (across banks and over years) in adjustment speeds. The mean variable 
adjustment speed is 0.29 for Tier1 capital and 0.31 for total capital,  which is consistent with 
De Jonghe and Öztekin’s (2015) estimate of 0.29 for a worldwide sample of banks, but lower 
than that found for large banks in the U.S. (0.45-0.57 by Berger et al., 2008) and Europe 
(0.47 by Gropp and Heider, 2010). Panel B in Table 4 reports the results where government-
owned banks are treated as a single group in columns 5-6 and differentiated into three sub-
groups in columns 7-8.  
The coefficient on Government is positive and significant in columns 5-6, suggesting that 
government-owned banks adjust capital at a faster speed than private banks, thus rejecting 
Hypothesis 1b but supporting the alternative Hypothesis 2b. Our explanations are as follows. 
First, government-owned banks take advantage of soft budget constraints and speed-up the 
adjustment process using state funds. Second, the literature suggests that government-owned 
banks face lower funding costs and higher credit ratings compared to private banks because 
of government support (Iannotta et al., 2013). Potentially low financing/transaction costs give 
these government-owned banks incentives to close capital gaps quickly. Third, unlike private 
banks that may decide to operate at sub-optimal capital levels due to higher transaction costs, 
this may not deter government-owned banks from adjusting capital towards targets since 
profit maximization is often not their main goal. Finally, the faster adjustment speeds may 
also be driven by the role of such banks to serve development/political and other goals such 
as financing government expenditure (see discussions in section 2 and evidence in footnote 6).  
As shown in columns 7-8, LGOBs are faster in adjusting Tier1 capital and SEOBs adjust 
both Tier1 and total capital more rapidly compared to private banks. The coefficient on 
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CGOBs is insignificant, which can be attributed to stronger moral hazard problems due to 
government support and protections that are more likely for CGOBs than for LGOBs and 
SEOBs. The evidence supports Hypotheses 3b: CGOBs adjust capital at slower speeds than 
LGOBs and SEOBs.  
The coefficient on Foreign is negative and significant, so foreign banks adjust their capital 
slower than domestic private banks. The results are consistent with expectations. Foreign 
banks on average have much higher capital ratios than other types of banks and also their 
target levels are much lower than actual capital ratios (as indicated by the negative GAPs in 
Table 3), so the need for adjustment is less pressing. It could also be because other factors 
such as geographical remoteness from headquarters exacerbate asymmetric information 
problems and reduce responsiveness to changing operating conditions.   
Coefficients on Financial institutions are positive and significant in three out of four 
regressions in columns 5-8 (Table 4), consistent with our expectations that banks with 
financial institution ownership adjust capital faster than banks that do not have such investors. 
This suggests that financial institutions’ monitoring reduces information asymmetries 
between shareholders and management and induces more rapid capital adjustment. Financial 
institutions have information advantage in financial markets which may also provide banks 
quick access to capital. Banks with financial institution ownership adjust toward their target 
capital ratios roughly 28 to 44 percentage points faster than those without this type of 
investor.  
As for the control variables, we find that a higher return on equity (ROE) slows down capital 
adjustment speeds. Banks with a greater ability to generate internal sources of capital 
(through enhanced retained earnings) may face less urgency in having to make prompt capital 
adjustments. We also find that income diversification slows down banks’ capital adjustment 
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speed, but the size of coefficients is small. Adjustment speeds are faster in a favourable 
macroeconomic environment (proxied by GDP growth) but do not appear to be influenced by 
credit risk (Risk), asset size and inflation.  Moreover, we find no evidence that adjustment 
speeds are different for banks with capital ratios above or below their target levels. 
4.3. Ownership and bank target capital ratios under variable adjustment speeds (Step 3) 
In this section, we re-estimate target capital ratios in equation (7) allowing for bank-specific 
variable adjustment speeds obtained from step 2 and test for ownership effects on bank target 
capital ratios. We apply a fixed effect estimator and the results are reported in Panel C of 
Table 4. These are our preferred results given the more realistic assumption of variable bank-
specific capital adjustment speeds. The coefficient on Government is positive and significant 
in columns 9-10, rejecting the Hypothesis 1a but supporting the Hypothesis 2a: government-
owned banks have higher target capital ratios than private banks. This result is consistent 
with the “development/political” view that government-owned banks have higher capital 
targets as they need more capital to finance development, politically preferred projects, or to 
help finance other government spending via the purchase of sovereign debt. Columns 11-12 
show that the positive government ownership effect exists for LGOBs and SEOBs, but not 
for CGOBs. Target capital ratios of CGOBs are the same as private banks, but lower than 
those of other two types of government banks, supporting Hypothesis 3a: CGOBs have lower 
target capital ratios than LGOBs and SEOBs. Compared to LGOBs and SEOBs, CGOBs 
enjoy more certain government support and the resultant moral hazard effects presumably 
tend to slacken their incentives and desire to hold higher capital and adjust capital quickly. 
Facing less certain government support, LGOBs and SEOBs tend to set higher target capital 
ratios than private banks by more than 6 percentage points in terms of Tier1 capital ratio and 
about 8 percentage points in terms total capital ratios. Moreover, the coefficient on Foreign is 
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positive and significant. On average, foreign banks’ target Tier1 and total capital ratios are 
higher than those of private banks roughly by 11 and 13 percentage points, respectively.  
Consistent with the literature (Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2010), we 
find a positive and economically significant impact of bank profitability on target capital 
ratios. Results in column 11 indicate that a one standard deviation increase in ROE will boost 
regulatory Tier1 capital ratios roughly by about 1.1 percentage points (0.157× 7).  Banks 
with income growth potential have higher target capital ratios, but the economic impact is 
small. More diversified banks have higher target capital ratios, consistent with the literature 
(Stiroh, 2004, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). As in column 11, a one standard deviation 
increase in the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income will boost Tier1 capital 
ratios roughly by 2.2 percentage points (0.28 × 8.03). Our results show no significant 
influence of bank risk and size on target capital ratios. 
We conduct an array of robustness tests, including (1) using a 10% threshold when 
classifying ownership types; (2) using alternative measures for control variables (return on 
assets (ROA) as a performance measure) and include extra control variables for bank 
liquidity and listing status; and also (3) using a subsample excluding foreign banks.  Findings 
from these unreported results are generally consistent and our main conclusions hold (these 
results are available from the authors on request).  
5. Bank ownership and capital adjustment strategy   
One might question the foundations of the above analysis: Do banks actually react to target 
capital ratios? In this section, we empirically address this issue by answering the following 
two questions: How do banks react to target capital ratios? And for undercapitalized banks’ 
(those with capital ratios below their targets), how do they adjust and does the process 
systematically vary by ownership type?   
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5.1. Capital adjustment through bank balance sheet 
When banks react to capital GAPs – the difference between target and actual capital ratios, 
their rebalancing strategies should be translated into changes in their balance sheet. We link 
GAPs to banks’ balance sheet movements to investigate whether and how banks achieve their 
target capital ratios. Banks are grouped into tertiles based on GAPs of their Tier1 capital 
ratios.
16
 The first, second, and third tertile represents overcapitalized banks with negative 
GAPs, banks with capital ratios close to their targets, and undercapitalized banks with 
positive GAPs, respectively. The average growth rates of key balance sheet items for each 
tertile are reported in Table 5.  
[Table 5 around here] 
Panel A reports relevant information on bank capital variables. Column 1 reports the sample 
means of balance sheet items, showing that banks on average have negative GAPs. 
Overcapitalized banks in tertile 1 (column 2) have the lowest equity growth (16.43%) and the 
highest in total assets (24.96%). This is consistent with the expectation that overcapitalized 
banks speed up assets expansion to adjust toward their targets. Undercapitalized banks in 
tertile 3 (column 4) rebalance their capital ratios by boosting equity at the fastest rate of 28.81% 
and a more moderate total assets growth rate of 22.65%. The mean equality tests (columns 5-
6) indicate that differences in the mean of capital variables between tertiles 1 and 2 and 
between tertiles 2 and 3 are statistically significant.  
Panel B presents the growth rates of key assets and liabilities. Overcapitalized banks in tertile 
1 expand all types of assets and liabilities at the fastest speeds (except for non-earning assets). 
The mean equality test in column 5 indicates that differences in the average growth rates of 
assets and liabilities between tertiles 1 and 2 are significant (except for fixed assets). As for 
                                                          
16
 Results from tertiles based on the GAPs of Total capital ratio are consistent and not reported to save space. 
28 
 
undercapitalized banks in tertile 3, despite significant capital shortfalls (larger GAPs), they 
adjust balance sheet similar to banks in tertile 2 – indicating a relatively more aggressive 
strategy and attitude to risk. As shown in column 6, the average growth rates of most assets 
and liabilities are statistically insignificant between tertiles 2 and 3. Overall evidence 
suggests that banks react to capital GAPs and move toward their target capital ratios through 
balance sheet adjustment.  
5.2. Bank ownership and balance sheet characteristics 
We are particularly interested in how undercapitalized banks (banks with capital ratios below 
their targets) adjust their balances sheets in order to move towards targets and whether their 
adjustment process is systematically correlated with ownership type.
 
In our sample, 35% of 
banks are undercapitalized viewing the Tier 1 capital ratio, of which 21% are government-
owned and 14% foreign, while all private banks are overcapitalized.
17
 Overcapitalized banks 
(with capital ratios above target) do not differ materially in adjusting their balance sheets and 
(as they are not of our main interest) we treat these as the default group. We regress the 
growth rates of key balance sheet items – Total asset, Loan, Other earning assets, Deposits, 
and Equity against ownership variables. Foreignunder and Governmentunder (CGOBunder, 
LGOBunder, and SEOBunder) act as proxy variables for undercapitalized foreign- and 
government-owned banks, respectively. Results are reported in Table 6 and all regressions 
control for size and year fixed effects. Government-owned banks are treated as one group in 
columns 1-5 and differentiated into three subgroups in columns 6-10.  
[Table 6 around here] 
                                                          
17
 Here target capital ratios are derived under bank specific variable adjustment speeds. Results for Tier 1 
capital ratio and Total capital ratio are consistent and the results presented in this section are based on Tier 1 
capital ratio.  
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We observe strong correlations between ownership features and key balance sheet items. 
Undercapitalized government-owned banks (columns 1-5) rapidly boost equity capital, but 
the growth rates of other balance sheet items are not significantly different from those of the 
control group – overcapitalized banks. These results are consistent with our main findings 
that government-owned banks tend to hold higher capital ratios and adjust their capital to the 
target level at faster speeds. Undercapitalized foreign banks, however, achieve target ratios 
by contracting total assets, loans and deposits at a faster rate, while their equity growth rate is 
not significantly different from that of overcapitalized banks. This is perhaps because foreign 
bank’s parent companies are reluctant to increase equity investment overseas.   
In columns 6-10, we observe variations in the rebalancing process across different 
government-owned banks. The growth rates of key balance sheet items of undercapitalized 
CGOBs are similar to those of overcapitalized banks, indicating that undercapitalized CGOBs 
do not actively rebalance towards target capital ratios. LGOBs boost equity capital at a higher 
rate, while SEOBs take a more active rebalancing approach by downsizing total assets and 
deposits while boosting equity. In short, our evidence suggests that varying types of 
government ownership have a differential impact on banks’ capital ratio rebalancing 
strategies.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the influence of ownership on bank capital behaviour with particular 
attention to different forms of government ownership using a unique dataset of Chinese banks 
from 2006 to 2015. We distinguish between banks owned by the central government 
(CGOBs), local government (LGOBs), state-owned enterprises (SEOBs), and (domestic) 
private and foreign stockholders. Our key finding is that ownership features matter for banks’ 
target capital ratios, adjustment speeds, and rebalancing strategies. First, compared with 
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private banks, government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and faster 
adjustment speeds, supporting the “development/political” view of government ownership in 
banks. Second, CGOBs’ target capital ratios are similar to those of private banks and 
significantly lower than other types of government-owned banks – LGOBs and SEOBS, after 
controlling for size effects. This is likely due to more profound moral hazard problems 
associated with CGOBs stemming from a combination of various factors, such as implicit 
government guarantees for support and regulatory forbearance. Third, regulatory capital 
requirements are not binding in China. Banks’ capital ratios are in excess of the regulatory 
minimum requirements and the majority of banks (65%) hold capital ratios above their 
targets. Fourth, we find that banks react to target capital ratios through balance sheet channels 
and undercapitalized banks’ rebalancing strategies vary with ownership type. In particular, 
benchmarking to overcapitalized banks, undercapitalized LGOBs and SEOBs increase equity 
directly, undercapitalized CGOBs make no effort to rebalance, and undercapitalized foreign 
banks contract assets and liabilities with no increase in equity.  
Our results shed light on the current debate on bank capital regulation and regulatory reforms 
by providing insights into how private and government ownership (central government, local 
government and SOEs) have a differential influence on bank capital behaviour. Ownership is 
an important parameter to consider when designing capital regulatory reforms and risk 
controls, especially in the post-crisis era with increased government involvement in banking. 
Our results help inform regulators as to the costs and speed of adjustment for banks of 
different ownership features when they are required to boost their capital positions in the 
event of a crisis. Future research on the potential effects of capital behaviour over longer 
economic cycles (after taking into account ownership effects) could also yield more fruitful 
information for policy makers and regulators. 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables  
Variable Definition  
Tier1Cap The ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets. 
TotalCap The ratio of total capital (Tier 1+ Tier2) to total risk-weighted assets. 
Government  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest owner is the government 
or state-owned enterprise that hold more than 5% of total outstanding 
stock and 0 otherwise.  
CGOB A dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest owner is the central 
government that hold more than 5% of total outstanding stock and 0 
otherwise. 
LGOB A dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest owner is the local 
government that hold more than 5% of total outstanding stock and 0 
otherwise.  
SEOB 
 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest owner is a state-owned 
enterprise that hold more than 5% of total outstanding stock and 0 
otherwise. 
Private A dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is neither a government-
owned bank nor a foreign bank and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign A dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest owner is a foreign 
investor that holds more than 5% of total outstanding stock and 0 
otherwise. 
Financial institutions(FIs) A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for banks with financial 
institution investors and 0 otherwise. 
ROE Return on equity: the ratio of net income over total equity. 
Risk NPL ratio: the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. 
Size  A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a bank’s total assets is 
greater than the average total assets of the banks in our sample and 0 
otherwise. 
Income growth The annual growth rate of total operating income. 
Diversification The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income. 
Below  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank’s actual capital. 
ratio is below the target capital ratio and 0 otherwise. 
GDP growth The annual percentage change in gross domestic product. 
Inflation The annual percentage change in the average consumer price index.      
Government debt  The ratio of government debt holdings to bank total assets. 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Capital ratios 
Tier1Cap 487 12.97  6.38  3.18  62.62  
TotalCap 487 14.78  6.03  3.24  62.62  
Equity to total assets 487 7.94  3.60  2.20  31.34  
Ownership  
Government    263 33.11 23.39 5.86 100 
CGOBs  48 60.29 19.79 26.48 100 
LGOBs  135 26.27 17.46 8.23 90.15 
SEOBs  80 28.81 22.49 6.94 100 
Private 41 10.31  4.99  5.07  80.45  
Foreign 146 86.53 30.53  10.63  100  
Financial institutions (dummy) 487 0.41  0.49  0.00  1.00  
Financial institutions (total shareholding) 487 3.8 7.68 0.00 42.64 
Control variables for partial adjustment model 
ROE (return on equity) 487 13.19  7.00  -4.42  58.17  
Risk (NPL ratio) 487 1.30  1.57  0.00  18.11  
Size 487 0.18  0.39  0.00  1.00  
Income growth 438 29.48  41.29  -35.87  381.97  
Diversification 487 8.03  37.19  -792.50  44.48  
Below (Tier1Cap targets from step1) 487 0.61  0.49  0.00  1.00  
Below (TotalCap targets from step1) 487 0.58  0.49  0.00  1.00  
GDP growth 487 8.74  1.76  6.90  14.23  
Inflation 487 2.78  1.73  -0.70  5.86  
Government debt holdings 406 6.98 5.74 0 29.53 
Balance sheet variables 
Total assets 487 1478  3567  4.35  22200  
Loans (net loan) 487 730  1818  3.21  11700  
Other earning assets 487 527  1179  0.39  6700  
Deposits 487 1101  2746  0.73  16300  
Equity 487 95  240  0.35  1721  
Notes: (1) This table reports the descriptive sample statistics. (2) Government: government-owned 
banks; CGOB/LGOB/SEOB: central government/local government/state enterprise-owned banks; 
Private: private (domestic) banks; Foreign: foreign banks. (3) All balance sheet variables are in billion 
RMB and other variable are either dummy variables or ratios. 
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Table 3: Key variables, target capital ratios and adjustment speeds across ownership types  
    CGOBs LGOBs SEOBs Foreign Private 
Panel A: Key bank-specific variables 
     
Tier1Cap 
 
10.39  11.22  10.59  17.98  10.64  
TotalCap 
 
12.94  13.18  12.95  18.96  12.73  
Total assets 
 
10692  380  1225  140  471  
Loans 
 
5403  151  606  62  232  
Deposits 
 
8280  238  848  91  326  
ROE (return on equity) 
 
17.16  16.12  14.20  6.99  16.27  
Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio 
 
1.74  1.55  1.15  0.91  1.51  
Income growth  16.98 30.65 40.65 29.11 23.68 
Diversification  12.74 6.42 8.94 5.55 11.58 
Panel B: Estimated target capital ratios, GAPs, and adjustment speed 
Target capital ratio:  
      
Under constant adjustment speed (results from step1) 
Tier1Cap 10.81  10.21  9.27  16.07  11.11  
TotalCap 13.37  12.05  11.82  17.36  13.37  
Under variable adjustment speed (results from step3) 
Tier1Cap 8.79  10.02  9.74  16.27  5.31  
TotalCap 11.84  12.40  12.73  16.54  8.29  
GAP = Target capital ratio - capital ratiot-1:      
Under constant adjustment speed  
Tier1Cap 0.72  -1.47  -1.66  -2.99  0.83  
TotalCap 0.68  -1.55  -1.45  -2.61  1.03  
Under variable adjustment speed   
Tier1Cap -1.23  -1.64  -1.10  -2.75  -5.00  
TotalCap -0.78  -1.18  -0.49  -3.41  -4.07  
Mean variable adjustment speeds (results from step2) 
Tier1Cap 0.20 0.26 0.60 0.25 0.26 
TotalCap 0.20 0.24 0.60 0.30 0.27 
Notes: (1) Panel A reports the mean of selected key bank-specific variables, while Panel B reports the mean of estimated target capital ratios, GAPs and adjustment 
speeds.  (2) Government: government-owned banks; CGOB/LGOB/SEOB: central government/local government/state enterprise-owned banks; Private: private banks; 
Foreign: foreign banks. Tier1Cap is Tier1 capital ratio, TotalCap is total capital ratio. (3) Total assets, loans and deposits are in billion RMB. 
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Table 4: The impact of ownership on bank target capital ratios and adjustment speeds  
 Panel A: Step 1 Target capital ratios CS (Obs365) Panel B: Step 2 Adjustment speeds (Obs 341) Panel C: Step 3 Target capital ratios VS (Obs341)  
 
Tier1Cap TotalCap Tier1Cap TotalCap Tier1Cap TotalCap Tier1Cap TotalCap Tier1Cap TotalCap Tier1Cap TotalCap 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Capital ratiot-1 0.568*** 0.506*** 0.575*** 0.517***         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Governmentt-1 -0.415 -0.584   0.399** 0.345*   5.244** 6.708***   
 (0.196) (0.111)   (0.015) (0.061)   (0.023) (0.004)   
CGOBt-1   0.352 0.425   0.036 0.079   4.983 6.216 
   (0.418) (0.345)   (0.863) (0.746)   (0.198) (0.130) 
LGOB t-1   -0.475 -0.748** 
  
0.348* 0.279   6.272** 7.668*** 
 
  (0.110) (0.027) 
  
(0.086) (0.202)   (0.024) (0.008) 
SEOB t-1   -0.558 -0.566   
0.684*** 0.694**   6.292** 8.030*** 
 
  (0.141) (0.104) 
  
(0.006) (0.015)   (0.027) (0.003) 
Foreign t-1 2.297*** 1.983*** 2.197*** 1.876*** -0.261* -0.371** -0.232 -0.350* 13.129*** 11.844*** 12.502*** 11.647*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.087) (0.048) (0.150) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FIs t-1     0.439** 0.360* 0.381** 0.276     
     (0.013) (0.076) (0.016) (0.120)     
ROEt-1 0.011 -0.010 0.013 -0.004 -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.032*** -0.037*** 0.184** 0.166** 0.157* 0.160* 
 (0.790) (0.838) (0.768) (0.932) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.030) (0.030) (0.066) (0.055) 
Riskt-1 0.187* 0.208* 0.166 0.187* -0.029 -0.018 -0.016 -0.008 -0.219 -0.182 -0.037 0.068 
 
(0.074) (0.089) (0.122) (0.096) (0.523) (0.688) (0.710) (0.863) (0.665) (0.755) (0.943) (0.894) 
Sizet-1 -0.050 0.192 -0.471 -0.379 -0.024 -0.021 -0.017 -0.016 -2.859 -2.102 -2.357 -1.970 
 
(0.863) (0.582) (0.177) (0.296) (0.383) (0.526) (0.554) (0.612) (0.182) (0.345) (0.291) (0.405) 
Income growth t-1 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001**   
    0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(0.004) (0.048) (0.002) (0.038)       (0.093) (0.045) (0.046) (0.024) 
Diversification t-1 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.017 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.290** 0.373*** 0.283** 0.340*** 
 
(0.604) (0.687) (0.602) (0.589) (0.008) (0.022) (0.002) (0.007) (0.013) (0.002) (0.019) (0.007) 
Belowt-1     -0.125 -0.077 -0.148 -0.105     
     (0.249) (0.477) (0.164) (0.318)     
GDPt-1     0.064** 0.071** 0.049* 0.061**     
     (0.030) (0.034) (0.065) (0.048)     
Inflation t-1 0.935*** 0.031 0.933*** 0.034 0.002 -0.006 0.006 -0.002 0.031 0.186 -0.129 0.017 
 (0.004) (0.735) (0.005) (0.697) (0.920) (0.774) (0.754) (0.909) (0.917) (0.550) (0.662) (0.955) 
AR(2)/Hansen
 0.10/0.29 0.10/0.11 0.10/0.31 0.10/0.13         
R-squared     0.32 0.28 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.33 0.21 0.31 
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Notes: (1) This table provides results from the three-step partial adjustment model applied to a sample of commercial banks operating in China over 2006 to 2015. Two different 
definitions of capital ratios are considered in our regression analysis – the Tier 1 capital ratio and the total capital ratio. (2) Panel A provides results of the first step partial 
adjustment model (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆(𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + (1 − 𝜆)𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + ti ,
~
 ) for the determinants of bank target capital ratios under a constant adjustment speed (CS), 
using the system GMM estimator. All explanatory variables enter regressions with a one year period lag. (3) Panel B provides results of the second step partial adjustment model 
(
tittitititi
GZkk ,,1,1,,
~ˆ)(    ) for the determinants of capital adjustment speeds, using the pooled OLS estimator. (4) Panel C provides results of the third step partial 
adjustment model ( titititititi XZZkk ,1,1,1,1,,
~
])ˆ[()ˆ1(    ) for the determinants of bank target capital ratios under variable adjustment speeds (VS) using the 
fixed effects estimator.  We relax the constraint on constant adjustment speed and allow it to vary across banks and over time. (5) ROE: return on equity; Government: 
government-owned banks; CGOB/LGOB/SEOB: central government/local government/state enterprises-owned banks; Foreign: foreign banks; and FIs: financial institutions. 
Private banks are omitted as the default group for comparison purpose. (6) Figures in parentheses are p-values; *, **, *** represents the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 5. Bank-level characteristics and capital adjustment 
 
Sample mean Tertile 1 Tertile 2 Tertile 3 Tertile 1 vs.2 Tertile 2 vs.3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Panel A: Capital variables 
GAP_Tier1Cap  -2.40 -9.12 -1.37 3.33 0.00
***
 0.00
***
 
GAP_TotalCap  -2.44 -9.34 -1.27 3.35 0.00
***
 0.00
***
 
Equity growth rate 
 
16.43 21.39 28.81 0.03
**
 0.02
**
 
Total asset growth rate 
 
24.96 19.29 22.65 0.03
**
 0.13 
Panel B: Balance growth rates 
Assets: Loan 47.60 22.18 17.89 18.15 0.09
*
 0.87 
Other earning assets 37.75 33.46 23.82 28.76 0.08
*
 0.40 
Non-earning assets 13.93 123.43 59.04 213.88 0.10
*
 0.00
***
 
Fixed assets 0.73 25.26 21.90 21.79 0.66 0.98 
Liabilities: Deposit 77.96 25.42 17.89 20.74 0.01
***
 0.18 
Other funding 22.04 113.92 32.34 57.94 0.03
**
 0.07
*
 
Note: (1) This table presents bank-level characteristics with respect to GAPs in the Tier1 capital ratio. GAPs are the difference between the target capital ratio and actual 
capital ratios in the previous year, and a negative GAP indicates that banks’ actual capital ratio is higher than target. (2) Panel A shows information on capital variables, 
and Panel B presents average growth rates of banks’ key assets and liability components. (3) Column 1 reports sample means of capital variables, assets components 
(scaled by total assets), and liabilities components (scaled by total liabilities); banks are grouped in to tertiles based on GAPs in Tier1 capital ratio under variable 
adjustment speed in columns 2-4; columns 5 and 6 report p-values of pairwise t-test of equality of means of tertiles 1 versus 2, and tertiles 2 versus 3, respectively; *, 
**, *** represents the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. (4) The sample is unbalanced with 487 bank-year observations, which is reduced to 414 when 
calculating growth rates and each tertile contains 113 observations. 
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Table 6. Correlates between the growth rates of balance sheet items and ownership features 
 Total Assets Loans 
Other 
earning 
assets 
Deposit Equity 
Total 
Assets 
Loans 
Other 
earning 
assets 
Deposit Equity 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Governmentunder -3.921 0.129 -1.118 -5.509 14.321***         
 
(0.219) (0.944) (0.841) (0.107) (0.000)        
 
CGOBunder         -0.988 4.268 -21.912 -2.779 2.531 
 
        (0.870) (0.293) (0.107) (0.664) (0.715) 
LGOBunder         0.945 1.620 7.947 3.551 18.765*** 
 
        (0.853) (0.539) (0.307) (0.510) (0.001) 
SEOBunder         -11.174** -3.519 -4.536 -16.869*** 19.046*** 
 
        (0.028) (0.188) (0.547) (0.002) (0.001) 
Foreignunder -11.606** -5.686** -8.837 -14.973*** 3.500 -11.596** -5.819** -8.235 -14.956*** 3.509 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.183) (0.002) (0.503) (0.011) (0.010) (0.213) (0.002) (0.500) 
Size -1.183 -2.581 -20.535*** 7.239 -24.603*** -2.186 -2.754 -16.858*** 5.530 -24.682*** 
 (0.862) (0.255) (0.000) (0.320) (0.002) (0.748) (0.239) (0.004) (0.444) (0.002) 
Constant 25.251*** 19.892*** 34.686*** 26.638*** 18.893*** 23.751*** 22.320*** 26.870*** 23.269*** 20.232*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. Obs 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
Note: This table reports the correlates between the growth rates of key balance sheet items and ownership features. The dependent variables are the growth rates of Total 
asset, Loan, Other earning assets, Deposits, and Equity. Explanatory variables are dummy variables for undercapitalized government- (central government-, local 
government-, and SOEs-) and foreign-owned banks. The default group is overcapitalized banks irrespective of ownership features, and therefore the coefficients capture the 
ownership effect on undercapitalized banks’ balance sheet adjustment process relative to overcapitalized banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
